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I. INTRODUCTION
The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations successfully yielded several
multilateral agreements, or "codes," primarily designed to reduce
non-tariff barriers to international trade.' The "Agreement on Inter-
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pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," ' 2 or "Subsidies Code,"
is probably the most complex and important of these multilateral
trade agreements. The Subsidies Code was constructed to discourage
the subsidization of domestic products and to clarify the rights of
importing states to counteract foreign subsidies by imposition of
countervailing duties. In broad terms, a subsidy is a bounty or grant
that a government provides which creates an economic benefit for
the production or distribution of goods or services.'
As the official title of the Subsidies Code suggests, the original
GATT discipline on subsidies and countervailing duties provides the
trade barriers has been the objective of seven "rounds" of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations. The latest and most comprehensive round was the Tokyo Round, held
in Geneva from 1973 to 1979, which aimed particularly at reducing and regulating
non-tariff barriers through the establishment of several codes of conduct. The main
Tokyo Round codes on non-tariff barriers are the Subsidies Code, the Anti-Dumping
Code, the Government Procurement Code, the Standards Code, the Customs Val-
uation Code, and the Licensing Code. These codes are international treaties to which
only states already parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter
referred to as "GATT" or "General Agreement"] can accede. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30, 1947, 51 Stat. A-il,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950), is applied by virture of the Protocol of
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat.
pts. V, VI, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, or the subsequent Protocols of
Accession. See generally K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS (1970); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (1975); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); E.
McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1982 & Supp. 1983); T. FLORY, LE GATT: DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMMERCE MONDIAL (1968); D. CARREAU, P. JUILLARD & T. FLORY,
DRorr INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE 255-314 (2d ed. 1980).
1 Done April 12, 1979, in force January 1, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No.
9619, reprinted in GATT, BISD 56 (26th Supp. 1978-79), and in 18 I.L.M. 579
(1979); 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 72 (1980); H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2 at 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code].
It is difficult to characterize conclusively a governmental practice as a "sub-
sidy." A distinction is generally made between subsidies available for exported goods
("export subsidies") and subsidies available for all goods produced ("domestic
subsidies" or "production subsidies"). GATT regulations restrict export subsidies
much more than production subsidies. However, there has been a growing recognition
that both types of subsidies can hinder free trade, as evidenced by the insertion of
a provision in the Subsidies Code, article 11, concerning production subsidies.
Curiously, neither the General Agreement nor the Subsidies Code expressly defines
"subsidy," although a non-exhaustive Illustrative List of Export Subsidies has been
annexed to the Code. Professor E. McGovern has recently described a subsidy as
"a measurable economic advantage afforded to an enterprise by or at the direction
of a government, without adequate recompense, and in a way which discriminates
against some other enterprise or economic activities in the same country." E.
McGoVERN, supra note 1, at 246.
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parameters of this agreement. Before the Tokyo Round, article XVI
and article VI of the General Agreement, along with the corresponding
Notes and Supplementary Provisions of Annex I, regulated the area
of subsidies and countervailing duties. Article XVI originally consisted
of only one paragraph, which required member states to notify the
GATT of any subsidy operating to increase exports or to decrease
imports, and to engage in good faith discussions regarding the pos-
sibility of limiting subsidizations. At the GATT's Ninth Session in
1955, article XVI was extensively amended to reflect concern over
the increasing use of export subsidies. Article XVI, as amended,
distinguished "primary" from "other than primary" products by
establishing a looser discipline for export subsidies on primary prod-
ucts. Article XVI:3 provides that member states "should seek to
avoid" subsidies on the export of primary products and that, in any
event, they cannot apply such subsidies to secure "more than an
equitable share of world export trade in that product." On the other
hand, article XVI:4 prohibits member states from placing export
subsidies on non-primary products that would create an export price
for those products lower than the state's domestic price. This is the
so-called "bi-level pricing" or "dual pricing" requirement.
Article VI authorizes member states to counteract either an export
or a domestic subsidy by imposing countervailing duties equal to or
less than the subsidy. It prohibits a state from imposing a counter-
vailing duty, however, unless the foreign subsidy causes or threatens
to cause "material injury" to that state's" domestic industry. A mem-
ber nation's retaliatory response to a foreign subsidy is therefore not
dependent upon the subsidy's legal status under article XVI, but is
determined rather by the subsidy's injurious effects upon the state's
home market.
4
The Subsidies Code has effected several noteworthy clarifications
of the law governing subsidies and countervailing duties under articles
VI and XVI of the General Agreement. Among the changes the Code
introduces are the strict prohibition of export subsidies on non-
primary products,5 the treatment of minerals as non-primary prod-
4 Under customary international law, the levy of a countervailing duty against
a subsidy that complies with article XVI of GATT might be categorized as a
"retorsion," i.e., a measure adopted in response to an unfriendly, though not illegal,
act of another state. On the other hand, the levy of a countervailing duty against
a subsidy which is illegal under article XVI could be seen as a "reprisal," i.e., a
measure adopted in retaliation for an illegal act of another state. See L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 888-89 (1980).
Article 9 of the Subsidies Code contains no reference to the condition of lower
19861
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 16:1
uCtS, 6 the adoption of an updated illustrative list of export subsidies, 7
and the recognition that domestic subsidies can also have harmful
trade effects. 8 In addition, the Code restricts the use of export sub-
sidies for primary products9 and clarifies the administration of na-
tional laws on countervailing duties.' 0
Besides providing the substantive law on subsidies and counter-
vailing duties, the Subsidies Code also establishes, like other Tokyo
Round codes, its own dispute settlement procedure for any controversy
that arises with regard to its provisions. This procedure is essentially
modeled after the general GATT procedure for the settlement of legal
claims." Although a detailed description of this system is not within
export prices, thus abolishing the "bi-level pricing" requirement of article XVI:4 of
the General Agreement. Obviously, the bi-level pricing rule still applies to GATT
members who are not parties to the Subsidies Code. See generally Barcel6, Subsidies,
Countervailing Duties and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 257, 265 (1980); Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1447, 1475-76 (1979) (authors suggest that the Subsidies Code has
not completely eliminated the bi-level pricing requirement).
6 Under the General Agreement, a primary product is "any product of farm,
forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such
processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume
in international trade." Note at article XVI, section B, para. 2. The Subsidies Code
has adopted this definition in its entirety with the exception of the words "or any
mineral." The states acceding to the Subsidies Code are therefore obliged, for the
purposes of the Code, to regard minerals as non-primary products. See generally
E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at 258-59.
7 See generally E. MCGOVERN, supra note 1, at 253-58; Barcel6, supra note 5,
at 265 n.32.
I The United States delegation obtained at the Tokyo Round the first clear
acknowledgement that domestic subsidies may adversely affect the economies of
other countries. See generally Graham, Reforming the International Trading System:
The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1, 22-23 (1979); Barcel6, supra note 5, at 261-64; Rivers & Greenwald, supra note
5, at 1470-75.
9 The Subsidies Code, besides clarifying the concept of "more than an equitable
share of world export trade" (article XVI:3 of the General Agreement), prohibits
subsidies on primary products when they involve material price undercutting in a
particular third market (i.e., selling at prices materially below those of other exporters
to the same market). See generally Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 5, at 1476-79.
10 Cf. Presidential Memorandum of January 4, 1979 on International Trade
Agreements, 44 Fed. Reg. 1933-34 (1979); reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 60-61 (1979).
" For a full description of GATT dispute settlement procedures, see Jackson.
GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade Disputes, 1967-68 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 144; Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 40-47 (1980); R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES (1978); Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement after
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the scope of this Article, a brief explanation of the procedure will
facilitate a better understanding of the two cases that are the focus
of this study.
Although the GATT mechanism for the resolution of trade disputes
settles most disputes at the consultations stage, the matter can be
referred to the Contracting Parties12 if consultations fail. In this event,
the Contracting Parties usually appoint a Panel, which is an ad hoc
body consisting of individuals acting in their individual capacities.
The Panel conducts its proceedings much like a judicial or arbitral
body in that contesting parties make written and/or oral arguments.
The Panel may consult experts on technical matters and ask questions
of the parties, and other interested states can intervene. If this pro-
cedure fails to produce a settlement, the Panel submits its factual
and legal findings in the form of a non-binding final report to the
Contracting Parties. Finally, the Contracting Parties may adopt, re-
ject, or disregard the report. Upon adoption, the Contracting Parties
may formally recommend that the offending member state discontinue
its harmful practices, or may authorize retaliation. 3 The primary aim
the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980);
Dekieffer, GATT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S.
Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317 (1980); Flory, Les accords du Tokio
Round du GA TT et la reforme des procedures de reglement des differends dans le
systeme commercial interetatique, 86 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 235 (1982).
12 The Contracting Parties are composed of all GATT member states acting jointly
and is the main organ of the organization, according to article XXV of the General
Agreement. Additionally, another GATT organ called the "Council" - a body
composed of all member states willing to be part of it - is empowered to act on
behalf of the Contracting Parties. See GATT Docs. SR.16/I1, 160 (1960), W. 16/
15/Corr. 1, 2 (1960); Amendments to the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the
Contracting Parties, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 8 (9th Supp. 1961).
Therefore, any action taken by the Contracting Parties to resolve GATT disputes
might also be taken by the Council. See generally J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 410-11, 418-19 (1977). For a discussion of the
legal differences between a body composed of states (such as the Contracting Parties
or the Council) and a body composed of individuals (such as a dispute settlement
Panel), see Morelli, Stati e individui nelle organizzazioni internazionali, 40 RIvISTA
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 3 (1957).
," Article XXIII of the General Agreement provides that, under "serious circum-
stances," the Contracting Parties may authorize the harmed parties "to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations
under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances."
So far, the Contracting Parties have authorized this "suspension of concessions or
obligations" only once. GATT, BISD 32 (1st Supp. 1953). The remedy is essentially
ineffective, especially when a small country suspends an obligation towards a large
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
of this dispute resolution procedure, however, is to promote concil-
iation, as evidenced by the emphasis on negotiated solutions and the
fact that a Panel report is not legally binding upon the parties to
the dispute.
4
The first two disputes under the Subsidies Code resulting in Panel
reports involve separate United States complaints against the Euro-
pean Economic Community (E.E.C.) concerning export subsidies on
wheat flour and pasta. Both disputes originated from petitions filed
with the United States Government by private parties pursuant to
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.11 This Article discusses
country. For example, in a recent dispute between the United States and Nicaragua,
the Panel concluded that the United States cut in the import quota for sugar from
Nicaragua was inconsistent with GATT obligations. Not withstanding the adoption
of the Panel report, Nicaragua considered that retaliatory measures, even if au-
thorized, would be contrary to its own interests. The impact on the United States
of any "suspension of obligations" by Nicaragua would be negligible and could
trigger further United States countermeasures. See GATT, GATT Activities 1984,
at 39 (1985).
"1 Under general international law, the GATT dispute settlement method might
be classified as one that attempts to promote conciliation. For a discussion of
conciliation and of the legal differences between conciliation and other methods of
international dispute settlement, see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-20
(7th ed. 1952); Fox, Conciliation, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS
93-100 (H. Waldock ed. 1972); J. P. COT, LA CONCILIATION INTERNATIONALE (1968);
Arangio-Ruiz, Controversie internazionali, 10 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DRrTTo 381, 401
(1962). But cf. Capotorti, Sugli aspetti quasi-arbitrali di taluneforme di conciliazione,
14 COMUNICAZIONI E S1-UDI 137 (1975) (emphasizes the loose legal nature of con-
ciliation and its multiple similarities with arbitration). The simultaneous presence in
the GATT dispute settlement procedure of negotiation and mediation characteristics
on the one hand, and arbitration elements on the other, make it difficult to define
its legal nature explicitly.
,5 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1983). Under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2411), as amended by the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress grants broad authority to
the President to either "enforce the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement" or to "respond to any act, policy or practice of a foreign country or
instrumentality" that is unfair. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982). "Unfair," as defined by
this provision, is anything which: "(i) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce." Id. The President can either initiate an action on his own or be prompted
by private petition, as has occurred in the two cases discussed in this analysis. In
either event, the President has complete discretion as to the form of action he will
take. The President may exercise his authority under section 301 with respect to
any goods or sector on either a discriminatory or a non-discriminatory basis, without
regard to whether such goods or sector were involved in the unfair act, policy, or
practice which is counteracted. Id. In addition, the President's determination is not
subject to judicial review. An analysis of the legal and political significances of
[Vol. 16:1
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these cases and analyzes several legal questions raised by the two
Panel reports. For example, did the two Panels effectively distinguish
between primary and non-primary products? How satisfactory was
one Panel's definition of "equitable share of world export trade"?
Which product truly benefited from the disputed E.E.C. subsidies?
Would the so-called refund or restitution by the E.E.C. more logically
have been classified as an export subsidy under GATT law? Was the
United States legally entitled to dispute the legality of the E.E.C.
practice? Finally, some general remarks are made regarding the prob-
lem of dispute settlement procedures under the legal framework of
GATT.
II. FACTS OF THE CASES
A. The Wheat Flour Case
On December 1, 1975, the Millers' National Federation filed a
section 301 petition on behalf of United States producers of wheat
flour, alleging that the E.E.C.'s subsidization of its wheat millers
hindered United States wheat flour exports to third-country markets.m6
The petition specifically alleged that the subsidies violated article XVI
of the GATT. 17 In response to this petition, the United States Gov-
ernment initiated consultations with the E.E.C. in accordance with
articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT. Due to the ongoing Tokyo
Round of trade negotiations, however, consultations were postponed
until September 1981, and at that time the United States and the
E.E.C. resumed discussions under the new Subsidies Code. 8 When
section 301 in the context of United States international trade law is not within the
scope of this article. A bibliography on this subject, however, might include Coffield,
Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government
Trade Actions: When, Why and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381 (1981);
Echols, Section 301: Access to Foreign Markets from an Agricultural Perspective,
6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 4 (1980-81); Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569 (1982); Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign
Trade Practice: The New Section 301 and GA 77 Nullification and Impairment, 59
MiNN. L. REv. 461 (1975); Note, Foreign Industrial Targeting: Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 as a Remedy, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (1985). For a discussion
of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, see Palmeter, The Trade and Tariff Act of
1984: From the Customs Treatment of Manhole Covers to the Return of Goods
from Outer Space, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 487 (1984).
,6 40 Fed. Reg. 57,249 (1975).
17 Id.
,s See Future of Bilateral Trade Uncertain as Wheat Flour Dispute Continues
Unabated, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 25, at 1029 (Mar. 29, 1983).
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bilateral consultations failed, the United States formally requested
that a Panel be assembled to hear the dispute. The Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 19 established the Panel on
January 22, 1982, for the following purpose:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the [Subsidies
Code], the facts of the matter referred to the Committee by the
United States concerning subsidies maintained by the European Com-
munities on the export of wheat flour and in the light of such facts
to present to the Committee its findings as provided for in Article
18 of the [Code]. 20
The three-member Panel2' ultimately rejected the United States com-
plaint and released its finding on March 3, 1983.22
B. The Pasta Case
On October 16, 1981, the National Pasta Association filed a Section
301 petition on behalf of major United States producers of pasta,
alleging that the E.E.C. was providing export subsidies for pasta in
'9 The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was established after
the Tokyo Round in accordance with article 16 of the Subsidies Code. The Committee
is composed of representatives from each state that is a party to the Code and must
meet at least twice a year. This Committee is an institutionalized aspect of the
Code's dispute resolution framework and plays a very important role in the settlement
of disputes. The Committee reviews all Panel reports and decides whether to make
recommendations to the parties or to authorize the harmed party to take counter-
measures in accordance with article 18 of the Subsidies Code. See generally Jackson,
GA TT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's
159, 176-80 (W.R. Cline ed. 1983).
20 Report by Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT, BISD
42, 46 (29th Supp. 1981-82).
25 The Panel, composed of the Chairman, Ambassador Fumihiko Suzuki, and
members Mr. Hobson and Mr. Lempen, met with the disputing parties on February
24, March 11, and April 6, 1982. The individuals who serve on GATT dispute panels
are usually national representatives to GATT, easily available because of their Geneva
residences. Although they are not necessarily trained in law, they are "knowledgeable
in the mysteries and folkways of 'GATT lore'," and more inclined than outside
experts to give weight to "political and pragmatic considerations." Jackson, The
Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GA TT, 72 AM. J. INT'L
L. 747, 756 (1978).
22 The Panel Report on wheat flour, GATT SCM/42, not yet officially published,
is reprinted in GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning E.C.
Subsidies to Wheat Farmers, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 22, at 899 (March
8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as GATT Dispute Panel Report]; Final Draft of GATT
Dispute Panel Findings on U.S. Complaint Concerning E.C. Subsidies of Wheat
Exports, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 25, at 1047 (March 29, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as Final Draft of GA 7T Dispute Panel Findings].
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violation of article XVI of the GATT and articles 8 and 9 of the
Subsidies Code. On November 30, 1981, the United States Trade
Representative initiated an investigation into these allegations,2 3 and
consultations followed between the United States and the E.E.C. The
parties failed to reach an agreement, however, and the United States
requested that a Panel be established in accordance with the procedure
provided for by the Subsidies Code. The Subsidies Committee estab-
lished a Panel on June 14, 1982 with the following Terms of Ref-
erence:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the [Subsidies
Code] and of the discussion in the Committee, the United States'
contention that the export subsidies on pasta products manufactured
from Durum Wheat are being granted by the European Community
in a manner inconsistent with Article 9 of the [Code], and to present
to the Committee its findings concerning the rights and obligations
of the Signatories party to the dispute under the relevant provisions
of the General Agreement as interpreted and applied by this [Code] .24
The five-member Panel25 ultimately ruled in favor of the United States
complaint, 26 releasing its final report on May 19, 1983.
III. THE PANEL REPORTS
A. Premise: The Disputed E.E.C. Practice
Both the pasta and the wheat flour subsidies challenged by the
United States complaints are part of the same E.E.C. practice con-
cerning cereals. 27 The E.E.C. has established numerous regulations
11 See 46 Fed. Reg. 59,675 (1981).
24 Report by Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note
20, at 47.
25 The Panel was composed of H.E. Ambassador E. Nettel (Chairman until March
9, 1983) and Mr. D.M. McPhail (Chairman after March 15, 1983), Mr. F. Laschinger,
Mr. M. Pullinen, and Mr. H.S. Puri. The Panel met with the disputing parties on
July 12 and October 8, 1982, and on March 29 and April 19, 1983.
26 The Panel Report, GATT SCM/43, not yet officially published, is reprinted
in GATT Pasta Panel Report on U.S. Section 301 Complaint Against European
Community Subsidies, May 19, 1983, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 12, at
468 (June 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Pasta Report]. See generally U.S. Pasta
Problem: It's Italian, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1983, at Dl, col. 4.
21 This practice has been a part of the basic E.E.C. provisions that established
the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.) since June 19, 1967. On this date, the
fundamental Council Regulation 120/67 was enacted. See 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 117) 2269 (1967). For a general discussion of the Common Agricultural Policy,
19861
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in the cereals industry to stabilize markets and to ensure a fair
standard of living for the agricultural community concerned. 28 These
regulations establish a single price system in the Community by
annually fixing a "target price," 2 9 an "intervention price," 30 and at
the borders, a "threshold price" 3 for every kind of cereal. The price
of imported products is adjusted to the Community price through a
"variable levy," which is calculated by subtracting the most favorable
world market price from the threshold price . 2 Upon export of a
product the Community may grant an "export refund" representing
the difference between the Community price and the world market
price."
Both United States complaints concern the "export side" of the
E.E.C. mechanism, although each differs in certain respects. In the
wheat flour case, the E.E.C. producers receive the refund on the
basis of the world price and the domestic price of wheat flour itself,
and thus benefit from a direct subsidy.34 Conversely, in the pasta
case, "the amount of the refund [is] determined on the basis of the
quantities of [durum wheat] actually used in the manufacture of
exported [pasta]."" The refund on pasta, therefore, appears designed
merely to promote the "equality of competition between the industries
which use Community [durum wheat] and those which use third
country [durum wheat] under inward processing arrangements. 3 6 The
see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNIEs, THE COMMON AGRxCULTUA.L POLICY,
(1974); E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 427-62 (1976); E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at 340-
42; Usher, Agricultural Markets: Their Price System and Financial Mechanisms,
1979 EUR. L. REv. 147. Council Regulation 120/67 was repealed by Council Reg-
ulation 2727/75 of October 29, 1975. See 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281) 1 (1975).
Council Regulation 2727/75 has subsequently been modified in some respects, but
persists as the basic statutory authority governing the disputed E.E.C. subsidies.
28 Council Regulation 2727/75, preamble, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281) 1
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Council Regulation No. 2727/751.
2 See Council Regulation 2727/75, art. 3, as amended by Council Regulation
1143/75, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 130) 1 (1976).
,o Id.
I, See Council Regulation 2727/75, supra note 28, art. 5, at 4.
32 Id. art. 13, at 6, 7.
" See id. art. 16, at 8.
14 See Council Regulation 2746/75, art. 10, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281)
78 (1975).
3 Council Regulation 3035/80, preamble, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 323) 27
(1980).
36 Id. art. 4, at 31. See generally E. McGOVERN, supra note I, at 95-97 (discussion
of "inward processing arrangements").
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implications of the basic difference between the subsidies on wheat
flour and the subsidies on pasta will become apparent upon analysis
of the two Panel reports.
B. The Panel Report on Wheat Flour
The wheat flour Panel report raises three main issues: (1) whether
wheat flour should be classified as a primary product; (2) whether
the E.E.C. subsidy enabled the Community to acquire more than an
equitable share of the world export trade in wheat flour; and (3)
whether E.E.C. producers exported subsidized wheat flour to par-
ticular markets at prices materially below those of other exporters.3 7
1. Wheat Flour as a Primary Product
Although different Code regulations apply depending upon whether
the disputed product is primary or non-primary,38 the Panel did not
directly address the issue of whether wheat flour was a primary or
processed product. The United States did not assert in its initial
complaint to the Subsidies Committee that wheat flour should be
regarded as a processed product.3 9 Only upon oral argument before
the Panel did the United States contend that wheat flour was a non-
primary product and that the E.E.C. export subsidies therefore con-
stituted a prima facie violation of article 9 of the Subsidies Code.4 0
1, Another controversial issue that this dispute raises concerns the role of non-
commercial exports in relation to the notion of world export trade. Since the Panel
did not give much attention to this issue it is not discussed here in great detail. For
a general analysis of the wheat flour case, see Boger, The United States-European
Community Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173,
208-15 (1984).
11 The Subsidies Code defines a primary product as "any product of farm, forest
or fishery . . . in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is
customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international
trade." GATT, Note article XVI, as amended by Subsidies Code, footnote 29 to
article 9, supra note 2; see supra note 6. The GATT legal distinction between primary
and other products is a consequence of the particular problems of international
trade in agricultural commodities. The international regulations concerning such
trade derive not only from the GATT, but also from the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECO-
SOC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UNCTAD-sponsored international
commodity agreements. See generally E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at 333-77; J.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 717-40. See also infra note 55.
11 See GATT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 2.1, at 900; cf. U.S.
Asks GA TT Subsidies Code Committee to Reopen Wheat Flour Subsidies Dispute,
19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 4, at 120 (Apr. 26, 1983).
o See GA TT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 2.3, at 900.
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Citing the fact that the United States had not raised this issue in its
initial complaint to the Subsidies Committee, the Panel report stated
that "this question did not constitute part of the matter referred to
the Panel by the Committee and therefore the Panel did not consider
the substantive issue involved."
4
'
The Panel's justification for not addressing the primary/non-pri-
mary product issue is unconvincing in that the report implies the
existence of a procedural rule that precludes parties to a GATT
dispute from raising new legal issues arising out of the same facts
once the dispute is submitted to the Panel.42
The dispute settlement provisions of the Subsidies Code, however,
do not embody any norm of this sort. Moreover, neither the "Un-
derstanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance '4 3 nor the related Contracting Parties' Decision of
29 November 1982" provide any support for such a restrictive rule.
On the contrary, the entire GATT system of dispute settlement is
characterized by flexible procedural requirements. 45 It is well-estab-
lished that the main duty of a Panel is "to find out the facts of a
case and the applicability of GATT provisions." When a Panel
determines that a particular GATT rule ought to apply to a dispute,
it should arguably apply the regulation even if both parties have
overlooked it. 4 Finally, the Terms of Reference established by the
41 See Final Draft of GA TT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.2,
at 1047.
42 See id.
41 Adopted November 28, 1975, L/4907, GATT, BISD 210 (26th Supp. 1978-79)
[hereinafter cited as Understanding on Dispute Settlement].
Dispute Settlement Procedures, GATT, BISD 13 (29th Supp. 1981-82).
41 But cf. Jackson, supra note 19, at 185 (author suggests that Panel decisions
could gradually establish more rigid procedural rules on a case-by-case basis). In
this event, the wheat flour Panel's handling of the primary/non-primary product
procedural issue could serve as a precedent for the establishment of a sort of
"preclusion rule;" once the Committee has appointed a Panel, the legal issues must
be framed as they were during the previous consultations.
46 Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 43, at 215.
" Under the procedural principle of jura novit curia a judge has the duty to
familiarize himself with the applicable law of a case without relying on the disputing
parties. Only the facts of a case are the direct responsibility of the parties. For
examples of the application of this procedural doctrine in international law, see the
S.S. Lotus case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 31 (judgment of
Sept. 7), and the dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the Electricity Company
of Sofia and Bulgaria case (Beig. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 77, at 89'
(judgment of Apr. 4); see also Witenberg, La theorie des preuves devant les juris-
dictions internationales, 56 RECUEIR DES COURS DE L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
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Subsidies Committee required the wheat flour Panel to examine the
facts "in the light of the relevant provisions" of the Subsidies Code.48
Consequently, the Panel could have applied any relevant Code pro-
vision.
One might argue, however, that the Panel did address this issue,
albeit indirectly. The report consistently interprets and applies pro-
visions that regulate subsidies of primary products in reaching its
conclusions on the propriety of the E.E.C.'s actions. 49 The interpre-
tation and application of these provisions would make no sense if
the product at issue were considered a non-primary one.
Nevertheless, the point is that the primary/non-primary product
distinction is a fundamental issue that should be definitively resolved
in every subsidies case before applying any GATT provision, re-
gardless of whether a party to the dispute raises it. Obviously, the
answer is sometimes so clear that the issue need not be seriously
discussed. No one would dispute, for example, that footwear is a
processed product while grapes are a primary product. On the other
hand, if the product in dispute was wine, the question could be more
complex. Only after having addressed this issue initially is it possible
to interpret and apply the appropriate provisions. As a matter of
course, articles XVI:3 of GATT and 10 of the Code, and articles
XVI:4 of GATT and 9 of the Code are mutually exclusive; either
pair of provisions may apply, depending on the answer to the primary/
non-primary question, but both never apply to the same product.
The Panel seemingly failed to appreciate this point, and consequently
gave an indirect, albeit clear, answer to a question it perhaps had
attempted to avoid. The report implicitly concludes that, for purposes
of GATT law, wheat flour is a primary product.
NATIONAL 1, 33-34 (1936); Barile, La rilevazione e l'integrazione del diritto internazionale
non scritto e la libertb di apprezzamento del giudice, 5 COMMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 141,
190 (1953). But see A. CASSESE, IL CONTROLLO INTERNAZIONALE 244 (1971). Perhaps
the doctrine of jura novit curia might be more accurately characterized as a "general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations" (one of the sources of international
law recognized by article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice),
rather than as a norm of customary international law. Obviously, this differentiation
is meaningless for scholars who recognize no distinction between the two sources,
and who deny the existence of "general principles" as an autonomous source of
international law.
48 See supra text accompanying note 20.
" Throughout the report, the Panel refers to articles XVI:3 of the GATT and
10 of the Subsidies Code, clearly assuming the "primary" status of wheat flour.
See, e.g., Final Draft of GA TT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, paras. 4.1-
4.36, at 1047-53.
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Regardless of how the report conveys the resolution of the primary/
non-primary issue, the result is consistent with previous GATT dis-
putes regarding wheat flour.50 The Panel's implicit determination also
makes sense from a practical point of view. Since wheat flour is
essentially crushed wheat, the crushing process could justifiably be
considered as a "processing customarily required" in accordance with
the GATT definition of primary product.5 Several other products
that undergo similar processing are generally deemed to be primary
products in GATT practice.
In the final analysis, the Panel report on wheat flour seems to
support the view that a relatively simple intervening stage in the
production process does not exclude a product from "primary prod-
uct" categorization. This conclusion perhaps assimilates GATT's pri-
mary product classification to the E.E.C.'s concept of "agricultural
product" as "the product of soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries
and products of first-stage processing directly related to these prod-
ucts."'5 2 As will be discussed, the Panel on pasta also contributed to
the possible settlement of the controversial primary product issue in
a similar sense."
2. Equitable Share of World Export Trade
The concept of "equitable share of world export trade" first ap-
peared in article 28 of the Havana Charter for the International Trade
Organization (ITO), and was later incorporated into article XVI of
GATT.14 This standard currently represents the principal legal limit
to the application of export subsidies to primary products." The
5o The well-known Australian complaint against French subsidies on wheat
flour, which in the late 1950's reached the stage of a Panel report. The Panel
indicated that wheat flour was a primary product. Report adopted November 21,
1958, L/924, GATT, BISD 46 (7th Supp. 1959). For a general discussion of this
dispute, see J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 380; R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 89, 289;
Boger, supra note 37, at 201. A parallel complaint brought by Australia against
Italy, and settled before the Panel issued its report, also indicated that wheat flour
was a primary product according to article XVI:3 of the GATT. The dispute was
settled on the basis of a revised subsidy program. GATT Docs. SR. 13/17 (November
17, 1958).
s, See supra notes 6, 38.
52 Article 38(1) of the Treaty of Rome (emphasis added), Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 100-08.
54 For a general account of the drafting history of GATT and ITO, see J. JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 35-57.
11 For a discussion of the concept of equitable share of world export trade, see
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"equitable share" concept is inherently obscure, but the Subsidies
Code reflects a desire to eliminate ambiguity.
Article 10:1 of the Code basically reproduces article XVI:3 of the
GATT by providing that one should consider "a previous repre-
sentative period" and any "special factor" affecting that product's
trade in ascertaining what an equitable market share is for a particular
product and for a particular exporting country. Article 10:2 represents
the Code's attempt to clarify the equitable share standard:
For purposes of Article XVI:3 of the General Agreement and
paragraph 1 above:
(a) 'more than equitable share of world export trade' shall in-
clude any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by
a signatory is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing
in mind the developments on world markets;
(b) with regard to new markets traditional patterns of supply of
the product concerned to the world market, region or country, in
which the new market is situated shall be taken into account in
determining 'equitable share of world export trade';
Phegan, GATT Article XVI(3): Export Subsidies and "Equitable Shares," 16 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 251 (1982); J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 392-96. The concept of
equitable share has sometimes been criticized for resting "on a static view of world
trade." Dodds, United States/Common Market Agricultural Trade and the GATT
Framework, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 326, 334 (1983). The less developed countries
in particular sharply criticize the "equitable share" rule as an example of the persistent
GATT bias in favor of the status quo and against any increase of world market
shares by their infant economies. The developed and developing countries have
traditionally been at odds on the issue of subsidies. One reason for this dichotomy
is that GATT's differentiation between primary and non-primary products and its
clear prohibition of subsidies only for non-primary products has only put developing
countries at a serious disadvantage, since their main potential exports (agricultural
commodities) must compete with the subsidized agricultural exports of the developed
countries. In addition, the GATT's diversified treatment of production subsidies
(allowed under article XVI, but subject to countervailing duties by importing countries
under article VI:3) and export subsidies (limited under article XVI) is a clear handicap
for developing countries. Significant production subsidies require the subsidizing
government to expend considerable wealth, while export subsidies can sometimes be
provided without huge expenses by the subsidizing government. Given the small
fiscal base of developing countries, the production subsidies that their governments
are permitted to provide under GATT are not feasible. Export subsidies, which are
feasible, are strictly limited, See Kelkar, GA TT Export Subsidies and Developing
Countries, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 368 (1980). The Subsidies Code has slightly
improvcd the situation from the developing countries' perspective, but the controversy
persists.
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(c) 'a previous representative period' shall normally be the three
most recent calendar years in which normal market conditions ex-
isted.5 6
Three previous GATT disputes concerning the issue of "equitable
share" have reached the stage of a Panel report. One of these disputes
involved an Australian complaint regarding French wheat flour ex-
ports. 7 The other two disputes were parallel cases that Australia and
Brazil brought against the E.E.C. concerning refunds on sugar ex-
ports .58
In the case involving Australia's complaint against France, the
Panel concluded that French exports had displaced Australian trade
in various wheat flour markets through a system of refunds which
essentially acted as export subsidies. The Panel stated that although
"there is no statistical definition of an 'equitable' share in world
exports, subsidy arrangements have contributed to a large extent to
the increase in France's exports of wheat and wheat flour," and, as
a result, "the present French share of world export trade, particularly
in wheat flour, is more than equitable. ' 59 The French wheat flour
case is so far the only instance in which a Panel found a market
share to be inequitable. By contrast, the Panel6° in the sugar cases
decided that "it was not in a position to reach a definite conclusion ' 6
as to whether the E.E.C. had obtained a more than equitable share
of world sugar trade, citing the difficulty in establishing a causal link
between the increase in the E.E.C.'s market share of sugar and the
decrease in the complainants' shares.6 1
56 Subsidies Code, article 10:2, supra note 2.
17 See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, GATT, BISD
46 (7th Supp. 1959). See generally the authors cited in supra note 50.
11 See European Communities - Refunds on Exports of Sugar, GATT, BISD 290
(26th Supp. 1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Australian Complaint]; European Com-
munities - Refunds on Exports of Sugar-Complaint by Brazil, GATT, BISD 69 (27th
Supp. 1979-80) [hereinafter cited as Brazilian Complaint]. See generally, Boger, supra
note 37, at 203; Note, European Community Resistance to the Enforcement of
GA TT Panel Decisions on Sugar Export Subsidies, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 397 (1982).
19 French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, supra note 57, at
53.
- Although there were officially two Panels, they were composed of the same
individuals. This identity of membership is clear upon a reading of the two reports,
which are very similar. Compare Australian Complaint supra note 58, with Brazilian
Complaint, supra note 58.
6! Australian Complaint, supra note 58, item f, at 319.
62 Id. In sitting for the Brazilian Case, the Panel also determined that, for the
same reasons, "it was not able to conclude" that the E.E.C. had captured a more
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Unfortunately, the 1983 wheat flour Panel adopted the more passive
posture taken in the sugar cases in addressing the equitable share
issue rather than the more dynamic attitude of the earlier GATT
wheat flour Panel. The report reveals a clear inconsistency between
the factual findings, which appear to favor the United States in light
of previous cases, and the legal conclusions, in which the Panel
appeared even more reluctant to take a clear position than its pred-
ecessor Panel in the sugar cases. 63
Factually, the Panel determined that "the E.E.C. share of world
exports of wheat flour has become larger over a time period when
payment by the E.E.C. of export subsidies was the general practice."64
In addition, the Panel concluded that the E.E.C. mechanism provides
"the E.E.C. trader with a certain advantage vis-a-vis other suppliers,
in that it subsidizes the export to the extent necessary to meet lower
price levels of wheat flour. ' '65
Although the E.E.C. asserted several "special factors" in defense
of its subsidization, the Panel assigned minimal weight to these ar-
guments in reaching its conclusions. Some of the special factors that
the E.E.C. submitted were rejected outright, such as the quality of
E.E.C. wheat flour, 66 the transportation costs, 67 and the his-
torical links with member states or alimentary habits of some mar-
than equitable share of the world sugar market. Brazilian Complaint, supra note
58, item e, at 97.
63 Former United States Trade Representative William Brock quickly pointed out
the inconsistencies of the Panel report. See 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 872
(1983); see also Boger, supra note 37, at 214.
4 Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.15, at
1049.
63 Id. para. 4.27, at 1052.
The E.E.C. argued that certain characteristics of European flours enabled
E.E.C. millers to produce at lower costs; moreover, international demand for the
high-protein flour that the United States supplied had recently declined. See GA TT
Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 2.27, at 911. The Panel found that
E.E.C. flours could not be cheaper, without the export subsidy, than United States
flours, in spite of quality differences. See Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel
Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.25, at 1052.
67 The E.E.C. pointed out that the most important and expanding markets for
wheat four were located in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas, obviously
very close to Europe, enabling the E.E.C. to have lower transportation costs. The
Panel noted, however, that other important markets were closer to the United States,
such as those in South and Central America. The Panel concluded, therefore, that
transportation costs "should be considered of minor importance in the overall
assessmcnt of market share developments." Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel
Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.24, at 1052.
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kets. 6 On the other hand, the Panel cited several factors as having
a possible effect on the decrease of the United States market share,
such as political changes in diplomatic relations, 69 United States non-
commercial sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act,70 and an absence of regular United States shipping lines
to certain markets. 7' The Panel's discussion of these factors, however,
61 The E.E.C. observed that several markets were traditionally supplied by its
member states because of their historical ties. See GA Ti Dispute Panel Report,
supra note 22, para. 2.20, at 910. Furthermore, the European flours were better
suited for the specific kinds of bread traditionally baked in some countries. Id. para.
2.27, at 911. The Panel determined that these factors were difficult to establish with
any certainty. See Final Draft of GA77 Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22,
para. 4.23, at 1051.
69 The Panel recognized that United States foreign policy could have played a
relevant role in hindering United States exports and in affecting market shares.
E.E.C. exports of flour undoubtedly benefited from specific political developments
involving the United States, such as embargoes or changes in diplomatic relations
with such nations as Angola, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, USSR,
and Vietnam. See Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22,
para. 4.18, at 1051.
70 Id. para. 4.20, at 1051. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act, more commonly known as the "Food for Peace Program," is codified at 7
U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (1982). The controversial point raised by "concessional exports"
(non-commercial deliveries in favor of less developed countries at very advantageous
conditions) with regard to both the product at issue and other commodities is whether
these kinds of exports ought to be included in the GATT concept of "world export
trade." The E.E.C. argues that concessional sales should be included in the overall
world-trade figure because there are no uniform and internationally recognized criteria
for distinguishing between commercial and concessional deliveries. The E.E.C. also
observes that, given the large share of wheat flour exports for which concessional
sales account, it would be counterintuitive to disregard them when assessing world
market shares. Reportedly, the United States and the E.E.C. exports under non-
commercial transactions account for approximately 7007%, and 10.8% respectively,
of their total exports of wheat flour. Consequently, the E.E.C. is understandably
interested in aggregating commercial and concessional figures. The United States,
by contrast, argues that only commercial sales should be taken into account for
GATT purposes and has presented figures to the Panel relating only to the commercial
markets. See GATT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, paras. 2.10-2.21, at 901-
10. The Panel took the position that, given the volume of non-commercial transactions
and their relevance in overall market developments, concessional exports "could not
be ignored." Final Draft of GA T Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, para.
4.7 n.1, at 1047. Nevertheless, the Panel determined that inclusion of concessional
exports in the case at issue would not be "a critical determinant as regards changing
market shares." Id. See generally Boger, supra note 37, at 188-90.
7, The Panel remarked that E.E.C. member states had regular shipping lines to
most of the markets located in Africa and in the Middle East. This fact enabled
E.E.C. exporters to fill even irregular and unpredictable orders for relatively small
amounts of wheat flour at reasonable costs. By contrast, the United States did not
benefit from regular shipping lines and had to resort to charters, thus being often
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did not seem to indicate that they were considered to have been a
significant contribution to the shift in world market shares of wheat
flour.
Nor did the Panel assign much weight to statistics which the United
States presented with regard to changes in both E.E.C. and United
States world market and selected individual market shares in wheat
flour, although the Panel acknowledged the reliability of these records.
Interestingly, the Panel did not address the old interpretative problem
raised by the "world markets" language of articles XVI:3 of GATT
and 10:2(a) of the Code. The problem is whether the language refers
to "world market," "individual markets," or both. 72 The GATT
Panel on the French exports of wheat flour specifically stated that
"the concept of 'equitable share' was meant to refer to share in
'world' export trade of a particular product and not to trade in that
product in individual markets. ' 73 The GATT Panel on sugar con-
firmed this interpretation. 74 Both Panels, however, gave substantial
consideration to individual markets to determine whether there was
a displacement of complainants' exports. 75 The 1983 Panel on wheat
flour did not explicitly address this issue, but nevertheless considered
both world and individual market shares to determine whether E.E.C.
subsidization had displaced United States wheat flour.
With regard to the "previous representative period" issue, the Panel
observed that since virtually every period had been affected by ag-
ricultural subsidies granted by various governments, the "three most
recent years in which normal conditions existed ' 76 should be the three
years preceding the United States complaint. 77 The Panel determined
unable to deliver small quantities of flour at reasonable prices. The Panel acknowl-
edged that the United States could "suffer some disadvantages vis-a-vis E.E.C.
exporters in these markets." Id. para. 4.22, at 1052.
72 See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 394-95; K. DAM, supra note 1, at
145.
71 French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, supra note 57, at
52.
7, "[Tihe Panel did not consider it necessary for the purpose of determining
whether a market share was a 'more than equitable share of world export trade' to
establish market shares in relation to concepts other than those of total world exports
... (emphasis added). Australian Complaint, supra note 58, at 307.
11 See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, supra note 57,
at 54-55; Brazilian Complaint, supra note 58, at 90.
76 Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 10(2)(c).
7 See Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, paras. 4.8
- 4.12, at 1047-48.
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that the basic pattern of market developments in other periods would
be analogous in any event.
During this three-year period, the United States enjoyed an annual
world market share of 27%, 25%, and 22%, respectively, representing
an annual average of approximately 25%. In 1980-81, the first year
after this period, the United States world market share was 21%, a
4% decrease from the preceding three years and a 16% decrease in
absolute terms.78 On the other hand, the E.E.C. held a world market
share of 54%, 57%, and 62% during the same three-year period,
representing an average of 58%. In 1980-81, the E.E.C. enjoyed a
66% world market share, 79 which constituted an 8% increase (14%
in absolute terms) in market share over the three previous years. This
increase would appear to bear a close inverse relationship to the 4%
decrease in the United States world market share.
Curiously, the Panel did not employ the same method for examining
changes in the United States and the E.E.C. individual market
shares, but instead compared a three-year period prior to the adoption
of the E.E.C. subsidies system (years 1959-60 through 1961-62) to
the most recent three-year period (years 1978-79 through 1980-81).
Twelve of the seventeen markets evaluated revealed a palpable de-
crease in United States imports and an evident increase in E.E.C.
imports. Moreover, nine of these twelve markets revealed a clear
proportionality between United States decreases and E.E.C. in-
creases, so
Both the records concerning total world market shares and indi-
vidual market shares seem to evidence existence of a causal link
between United States losses and E.E.C. gains in the world wheat
flour trade. Nevertheless, the Panel found that "despite considerable
increase in E.E.C. exports, market displacement in the sense of Article
71 GA TT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 2.11, Table III, at 904-05.
79 Id.
so Id., Table IV, at 905-08. The following figures show increases and decreases
in market shares over the three-year periods indicated in the text: (1) Barbados:
U.S. -43%, E.E.C. +39%; (2) Cameroon: U.S. -100070, E.E.C. + 100%; (3) Chile:
U.S. -70%, E.E.C. +640o; (4) Isreal: U.S. -99%, E.E.C. +99%; (5) Jamaica: U.S.
-907o, E.E.C. +45%; (6) Jordan: U.S. -26%, E.E.C. +26%; (7) Lebanon: U.S.
-98%, E.E.C. +98%; (8) Nigeria: U.S. -49%, E.E.C. +94%; (9) Philippines: U.S.
-3607o, E.E.C. +35%; (10) Saudi Arabia U.S. -54%, E.E.C. +59%; (I1) Sierra
Leone: U.S. -19%, E.E.C. + 100%; (12) Trinidad-Tobago: U.S. -42%, E.E.C.
+64%; (13) Zaire: U.S. 0%, E.E.C. +57%; (14) Egypt: U.S. +11%, E.E.C.
+3307o; (15) Sri Lanka: U.S. +0.5%, E.E.C. -1%; (16) Syria: U.S. +2%, E.E.C.
+970o; (17) Yemen: U.S. 0%, E.E.C. 0%. Id.
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10:2(a) was not evident in the seventeen markets presented by the
USA and examined by the Panel." 81 The Panel vacillated on this
point, however, since it conceded that "it could not rule out the
possibility that the application of E.E.C. export subsidies had resulted
in reduced sales opportunities for the United States."
'8 2
The Panel's fence-sitting does little to promote efficiency in world
trade law. Obviously, one can appreciate the Panel's observation that
there are "difficulties inherent in the concept of 'more than equitable
share', ' 8 3 but a Panel should try to attenuate those difficulties instead
of using them as an excuse for not making a decision. The Panel
perhaps would have provided a greater service by deciding one way
or the other whether the E.E.C. had acquired a more than equitable
share in the world market. Even incorrect decisions may help to refine
legal standards by establishing a degree of predictability.
4
A more imaginative approach to the equitable share issue might
have consisted, for example, of shifting the burden of proof from
the complaining party to the accused party once the complainant had
proven certain increases and corresponding decreases of market shares.
Under this approach, the complaining state would have to make a
prima facie case showing: (1) existence of an export subsidy, and (2)
a significant change in market shares. Such a showing would create
the presumption of a causal link between the accused state's subsidies
and the complaining state's market displacement. An accused state
would then be required to rebut this presumption by proving the
nonexistence of a causal link. Failure to rebut the presumption of
the causal link adequately would result in judgment for the com-
plainant.
This analytical framework would relieve the complainant of the
onerou-s burden of conclusively establishing a causal link between
another state's subsidies and its own market displacement. Conversely,
the accused state would face the more rigorous burden of affirmatively
showing that its subsidies did not effect an inequitable imbalance
1, Final Draft of GA TT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.28, at
1052.
8'" Id. para. 4.29.
83 GA TT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, at 899.
14 But see Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfin-
ished Business, supra note 11, at 189-92. This author argues that the use of the no-
decision technique by Panels can be a positive development that may discourage the
pronouncement of harmful legal rulings in "wrong cases."
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between its own market share and the complainant's market share. 85
Had the Panel adopted this approach, the E.E.C. could have had
difficulty legitimizing its subsidized exports, and the Panel itself could
have clarified the concept of equitable share.
3. Material Price Undercutting
In addition to the equitable share rule, the Subsidies Code contains
another standard designed to discourage export subsidies on primary
products - the "material price undercutting" restriction. Article 10:3
of the Code prohibits signatories from granting "export subsidies on
exports of certain primary products to a particular market in a manner
which results in prices materially below those of other suppliers to
the same market. 8
6
The Tokyo Round drafters adopted the price undercutting concept
from the 1958 Panel report on French wheat flour, 7 regarding it as
a viable alternative to the equitable share standard. Unlike the latter
concept, which requires a somewhat subjective determination of "world
export" and "world markets," the price undercutting standard is
based upon sales in specific third-country markets. Thus, a com-
plaining state could find it easier to demonstrate the material un-
dercutting of its prices in a particular market rather than the inequitable
reduction of its world market shares.8 8 In the first dispute concerning
an allegation of material price undercutting, however, article 10:3 of
the Subsidies Code proved difficult to apply.
In the 1983 wheat flour case, the United States claimed that the
E.E.C. underpriced its competitors by granting its exporters whatever
amount of subsidy needed to obtain such a result.8 9 The United States
cited ten cases in which both United States and E.E.C. exporters of
11 A similar line of reasoning was employed by the 1985 GATT Panel on French
exports of wheat flour, see supra notes 50, 57-59 and accompanying text, which
placed the burden of justifying subsidization on France and gave the benefit of the
doubt to Australia. See Boger, supra note 37, at 203; Phegan, supra note 55, at
263.
86 Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 10:3.
81 See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat Flour, supra note 57,
at 53. Interestingly, the Panel in the 1958 case used the price undercutting concept
merely as one factor in concluding that France's share of world export trade was
more than equitable. Id. By contrast, the price undercutting concept emerged in the
Subsidies Code as an additional standard, definitionally unrelated to the equitable
share rule.
" See generally Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 5, at 1478-79.
" GATT Dispute Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 2.22, at 910.
(Vol. 16:1
SUBSIDIES CODE DISPUTES
wheat flour had made offers in response to specific tenders. 9° In each
case, E.E.C. prices were substantially lower. The United States argued
that these ten cases "were not isolated instances but part of a sys-
tematic pattern," and that "over the 1976-1981 period . . .E.E.C.
prices had constantly been below those of the United States." 9'
The E.E.C. countered by arguing that in some of these cases, a
valid comparison between E.E.C. and United States offers could not
be made since European and North American flours were of different
qualities. 92 The E.E.C. also pointed out that the United States had
quoted C. & F. prices (i.e., including freight charges), lower for
shipments from Europe, whereas an objective comparison would have
been based on prices F.O.B. at the place of destination (i.e., with
delivery at seller's expense). 93 Moreover, the E.E.C. contended that
the absence of relevant details such as qualities and quantities of
wheat flour actually traded, or conversion rates at the time of the
offers, made the United States allegations unreliable. 94
The Panel basically accepted the E.E.C.'s objections and deter-
mined that not enough information was available "to reach a definite
conclusion as to whether price undercutting in the sense of article
10:3 .had occurred." 95 In all likelihood, the available data were neither
detailed nor accurate enough to support the United States complaint.
Consequently, the Panel did not go out of its way to address the
material price undercutting issue. The Panel's conclusion thus leaves
all of the basic questions about this issue unresolved. For example,
by how much does a supplier have to underprice its competitors to
meet this standard? How long must price undercutting persist to
I Id. paras. 2.23-2.25, at 910-11.
"Id. para. 2.24, at 911.
92 Id. para. 2.27, at 911.
93 Id.
Id. para. 2.30, at 912.
Final Draft of GA TT Dispute Panel Findings, supra note 22, para. 4.34, at
1053. The Panel remarked that of the ten cases that the United States presented,
five could not be examined because they either predated the entry into force of the
Subsidies Code or contained "estimated" or "reported" figures. Id. para. 4.31 n.1,
at 1053. As for the remaining five cases, which concerned tenders made in Sri
Lanka, Yemen, Jamaica, and Nigeria, the Panel observed that "for three particular
markets only one specific transaction was presented in each case, and that while
two cases were reported for Yemen, only one U.S. price was quoted in each case."
Id. para. 4.34, at 1053. The Panel also determined that the differences in qualities
and quantities of wheat flour shipments and the instability of prices in the wheat
flour markets made it difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion. Id. para. 4.35, at
1053.
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establish its "material" character? Should the purpose, or lack
thereof, to drive competitors out of the market be taken into
account? What analogy might be drawn with the antitrust vio-
lation of "predatory pricing?" 96 Should a mere price shaving be
sufficient to create a violation, if it substantially affects the al-
location of sales among exporters? 97 Should a causal connection
between a subsidy and a demonstrated price undercutting practice
be generally presumed?
Unfortunately, the Panel did not address these questions. Al-
though a comparison with the Panel's treatment of the equitable
share issue does not reveal a similar inconsistency between factual
findings and legal conclusions, its passive treatment of the price
undercutting issue is far from satisfactory.
The wheat flour case raised several controversial issues con-
cerning the GATT set of rules on export subsidies on primary
products. The Panel, however, appeared to have missed the op-
portunity to provide an authoritative interpretation of articles
XVI:3 of the General Agreement and 10 of the Subsidies Code.
As one observer has noted, "the GATT Subsidies Code ... is
not as detailed as necessary to cope with the increasing use of
domestic aids, but this drawback could be offset by a series of
imaginative panel decisions that begin to delineate important areas
of trade distortions in this area." ' 98 Unfortunately, the first Panel
report under the Subsidies Code appears to be neither imaginative
nor very accurate. 99
- See generally L. SULLIVAN, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 683-84 (1977).
91 Cf. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 5, at 1479 (reporting that the United States
would maintain that the price undercutting rule forbids price shaving practices).
91 R. BALDWIN, BEYOND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 21 (1979).
" But see the "Leutwiler Report," which has implicitly justified the disappointing
ruling of this Panel because of the vagueness and inappropriateness of the "more
than an equitable share of world export trade" concept: "We believe this concept
is economically misconceived, since it implicitly endorses market-sharing. It is also
too vague and subjective to permit clear judgement on whether a subsidy is acceptable
or not - as was shown by the result of a U.S. complaint to GATT about European
exports of subsidized flour. . . . A better test of legitimacy than that of 'equitable
shares' is needed for subsidies on primary products: it is not evident to us why such
subsidies should be legitimate at all, when those on manufactures are banned."
GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future 40 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 716,
735 (1985). The "Leutwiler Report," drafted by a group of trade experts appointed
.in 1983 by the Director-General of GATT to make an independent study of problems
facing the international trade system, consists of fifteen recommendations with
commentaries in the area of international trade law. The report became public in
March 1985. See 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 301 (1985).
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C. The Panel Report on Pasta
The pasta case presents four main issues: (1) whether pasta is a
primary product; (2) whether the E.E.C. subsidy was actually applied
to pasta exports to benefit pasta manufacturers; (3) whether the so-
called refund or restitution is a true export subsidy; and (4) whether
the United States is entitled to contest the legality of the E.E.C.
practice under international law.
1. Pasta as Non-Primary Product
As discussed earlier, the primary/non-primary product issue should
be a preliminary question in every GATT case concerning subsidies,
since there is a significant difference in legal treatment between sub-
sidies applied to "certain primary products" and subsidies applied
to "products other than certain primary products."'1° Only after
classification as primary or non-primary is it possible to determine
whether a particular product subsidy is consistent with GATT reg-
ulations. As a matter of course, it is always in the interest of a
subsidizing state to establish that a product is a primary one since
the rules governing subsidies on non-primary products are much more
restrictive.
In the pasta case, this issue produced little controversy; 0' neither
party to the dispute actually contended that pasta was a primary
product within the meaning of article 9 of the Subsidies Code. 02
Pasta does not seem to be a borderline case between primary and
non-primary products because it requires two intervening stages in
its production process. First, durum wheat is converted into semolina
flour, which is then processed into pasta. 03 Statistics reveal that the
pasta production process involves approximately a 44% value-added
labor to semolina flour.' °4
,00 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
,o, The prominence of the primary product issue in the pasta case has perhaps
been overemphasized by some reports. See GATT Panel Decides in Favor of U.S.
Complaint on Imports of Pasta from EC, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 4,
at 141 (Apr. 27, 1983); GATT Panel Decides in Favor of U.S. in 301 Pasta Subsidies
Complaint, 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 4, at 112 (Apr. 26, 1983).
102 Compare the United States arguments, Pasta Report, supra note 26, paras. 3.1
- 3.6, at 471-72, with the E.E.C. arguments, id. paras. 3.7 - 3.14, at 472-74.
103 Section 301 Petition by the National Pasta Association, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,677
(1981).
,01 Id. at 59,678.
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The Panel stated that "pasta was not a primary product but was
a processed agricultural product."' 0 A comparison of this statement
with the wheat flour Panel's treatment of that product's classification '°
reveals a basis for distinguishing between primary and non-primary
products under the Subsidies Code. Since pasta is a product of second-
stage processing and has been classified as a non-primary product,
while wheat flour is a product of first-stage processing and has been
classified as a primary product, the distinction between a primary
and a non-primary product must lie somewhere between a first-stage
and a second-stage processed product. Since the Panel hearing the
pasta dispute "had no hesitation in concluding that pasta was not a
primary product,' ' 0 7 and the Panel hearing the wheat flour dispute
essentially dodged the issue, 08 the dividing line would seem to exist
very close to a first-stage processed product. Specifically, the primary/
non-primary product distinction might be made on the basis of the
complexity of the product's processing. Whenever the first-stage proc-
essing that a purely primary product undergoes is basic and the derived
product is directly related to the primary one, such a product could
be classified as primary. Whenever the first-stage processing, however,
is more complex, more costly, and the resulting product is less directly
related to the original product, such a product might more likely be
considered a non-primary one. Obviously, some uncertainties still
persist in borderline cases, and future disputes will serve to refine
the primary/non-primary distinction.
2. Product Benefiting from the Subsidy
In the wheat flour case, the wheat flour producers undoubtedly
directly benefited from the E.E.C. subsidy. In the pasta case, however,
the crucial issue was whether the E.E.C. subsidy benefits producers
of pasta or producers of durum wheat. If the subsidy benefits pasta
producers, articles XVI:4 of GATT and 9 of the Subsidies Code
should apply since pasta is a non-primary product. If, on the other
hand, the subsidy benefits durum wheat producers, articles XVI:3 of
GATT and 10 of the Code should govern since wheat is a primary
product.
105 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.2, at 374.
"06 See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
107 E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, § 11.323 (Supp. 1983).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
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That the refund is materially delivered to the pasta producers is
undisputed."09 The amount of the refund, however, equals the dif-
ference between the price the pasta producers paid for the durum
wheat and the price they would have paid if they could have purchased
the wheat on the world market." 0 If the E.E.C. had not established
a system of variable levies for imports, guaranteed minimum prices
for domestic products, and connected refunds for exports, the Eu-
ropean pasta manufacturers would have bought durum wheat at the
lowest price available on the world market and would ultimately have
exported pasta at the same price at which they are now exporting.
Without a refund, the exporters of pasta would bear the cost of the
mechanism protecting the Community wheat market and would face
a negative export subsidy."' With a refund, they are able to offset
the negative subsidy and export at the same price they would have
absent the E.E.C. mechanism.
The E.E.C. producers of durum wheat enjoy the real advantage
of this system. They can either export the wheat and receive the
subsidy directly, or sell it to manufacturers of pasta or other durum
wheat-based products at artificially high prices, benefiting from the
subsidy indirectly. While the producers benefit under either option,
the manufacturers of pasta lose - as do the European consumers
- if they sell within the E.E.C., and break even if they export. As
a result, one could logically argue that the producers of durum wheat
are the principal beneficiaries of the subsidy, and that article XVI:3
of GATT as interpreted by article 10 of the Subsidies Code should
apply in this case.
This argument has been presented in response to similar subsidi-
zation arrangements. For instance, the International Trade Admin-
istration (I.T.A.) of the United States Department of Commerce has
taken such a position in a countervailing duty case on steel." 2 In
this dispute, the United States steel producers contested German coal
subsidies which were being used by European steel producers. The
I.T.A. observed that:
[B]enefits bestowed upon the manufacture of an input do not
flow down to the purchaser of that input if the sale is transacted
119 See 23 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 323) 27 (1980).
110 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
I See Low, The Definition of "Export Subsidies" in GA TT, 16 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 375 (1982).
"I See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Prod-
ucts from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,316 (1982).
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at arm's length. In an arm's length transaction, the seller generally
attempts to maximize its total revenue by charging as high a price
and selling as large a volume as the market will bear." 3
This observation is equally descriptive of what has occurred in the
E.E.C.'s subsidization of durum wheat. The pasta producers do not
share the benefit of the E.E.C. subsidy with the durum wheat pro-
ducers because they deal with the latter at arm's length, and buy
durum wheat without enjoying any special privileges.
This situation should be carefully distinguished from the "upstream
subsidy" practice. An "upstream subsidy" is generally defined as a
subsidy which: (a) is applied to product x (the input product), which
is used to manufacture or produce final product y in the same country;
(b) creates a competitive benefit, i.e., a price on input product x
which is lower for the manufacturers of final product y than for any
other buyer; and (c) has a significant effect on the price of final
product y. Since the subsidy promotes the production of final product
y, the subsidizing government has effectively aided the producers of
y without granting them a direct subsidy."14
In the pasta case, the price of durum wheat for the E.E.C. producers
of pasta is the wheat's generally available price in the E.E.C. markets.
This does not present a case of an "upstream subsidy," since condition
(b) above is not met. In the pasta case, as well as in the previously
mentioned steel case, the benefit of the subsidy is not ultimately
transferred to the final product, but is restricted to the manufacture
of the input product. As the I.T.A. observed in the steel case, "the
real economic effect of German subsidies is to penalize, not assist,
German steel companies. As a result of the German coal policy,
German steel companies are required to pay a slight premium above
the world market price for their coal purchases."" ' 5
13 Id. at 39,319.
"4 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 includes an "upstream subsidies" provision
(§ 771A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by § 613 of the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984) that expressly allows the I.T.A. to impose a countervailing duty equal
to the amount of the "competitive benefit" derived from the upstream subsidy. The
consistency of this upstream subsidies provision with GATT rules is questionable,
particularly in light of articles 11:4 and 19:1 of the Subsidies Code. The Tariff and
Trade Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS SuPP. (No. 10) (Dec. 1984). Cf. Note, Upstream
Subsidies and U.S. Countervailing Duty Law: The Mexican Ammonia Decision and
the Trade Remedies Reform Act, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 293-97 (1984).
"I See supra note 112 at 39,322.
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The pasta case represents a parallel cause-and-effect relationship.
Pasta producers are penalized, not benefited, by the durum wheat
purchased above the world market price. Consequently, the disputed
E.E.C. practice adversely affected the United States exporters of
durum wheat, not the United States manufacturers of pasta. The
majority of the Panel, however, was of the opinion that "durum
wheat incorporated in pasta products could not be considered as a
separate 'primary product' and the E.E.C. export refunds paid
to the exporters of pasta products could not be considered to be paid
on the export of durum. wheat. ' "1 6 The basis for this finding seems
to be that the refunds are in fact paid to the exporters of pasta, but,
as the preceding analysis suggests, this observation fails to consider
who has truly benefited from the subsidy. As a dissenting member
of the Panel observed, "the refund ... improved the competitive
position of the E.E.C. durum wheat producers rather than the proc-
essing industry and should consequently be considered as a subsidy
on durum wheat." "1 7
The Panel's majority also cited the need to give "ordinary meaning"
to article XVI of GATT and articles 9 and 10 of the Code as a
whole by considering these provisions together "in their context and
in the light of their object and purpose.""' This observation is merely
a restatement of article 31:1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 19 however, and the legal reasoning underlying the Panel's
conclusion is not very clear. Hopefully, future Panels will consider
the true beneficiary of a subsidy before rejecting that subsidy as
incompatible with GATT rules.
3. The Refund as an Export Subsidy
The Panel Report on pasta perfunctorily concluded that the disputed
refund was an export subsidy, since it found that the E.E.C.'s sub-
sidization automatically operated to increase exports and that the
E.E.C. had issued notice of its practice consistent with article XVI: I
of the GATT.'20 This conclusion, however, might be challenged on
several grounds. First, the Panel did not explain adequately why it
116 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.4, at 474.
"' Id. para. 5.1, at 476.
Id. para. 4.4, at 474.
, "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
,20 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.3, at 474.
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classified the disputed subsidy as an export and not a domestic
subsidy. The Panel seemed to conclude that since the E.E.C. issued
notice of its subsidization, the subsidy must have been an export
subsidy. However, since article XVI:I of GATT requires notification
of any subsidy which operates even indirectly to increase exports or
to reduce imports, both domestic and export subsidies would seem
to fall within the scope of this clause.
Consequently, article XVI:1 should not be used as a decisive cri-
terion in characterizing a particular subsidy. Otherwise, the notifi-
cation provision of article XVI:I acts as an "estoppel"'' 2' against any
defense of a notified practice and discourages states from complying
with this provision with regard to questionable practices.
The Panel's position concerning notifications of subsidies is also
inconsistent with the Subsidies Code Committee's position on this
issue. The Committee has emphasized the importance of notifications
in promoting international consistency in the area of subsidization,
and has downplayed any fear of a possible "self-incriminating" effect
of such notifications. 22
Another reason for challenging the Panel's characterization of the
refund as an export subsidy is the possibility that the E.E.C. practice
could be seen as an admissible "remission" or "drawback" of import
charges levied on imported goods incorporated into the exported
product. Paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies,
which has been incorporated into the Subsidies Code, permits this
practice on the condition that the remission not exceed the import
levy on the input product.'23 This scheme would seem to apply to
2I "Estoppel" is essentially a legal bar or restriction which precludes assertion or
denial of a given state of facts because of previous conduct or acquiescence. See
generally Bowett, Estoppel before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Ac-
quiescenee, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1957); Mac Gibbon, Estoppel in International
Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 468 (1958); A. Martin, L'ESTOPPEL EN DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC (1979).
22 "Although some delegations had misgivings about the incriminating effect of
notifications, the Committee considered that such misgivings were not justified and
consequently they should not prevent Signatories from fulfilling their obligations."
Report by Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 20, at
45 (emphasis added).
2I The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies has updated a former list based on
a 1960 GATT Working Party Report. GATT, BISD 185-88 (9th Supp. 1961). This
is a non-exhaustive list which enumerates the most common governmental practices
characterized as subsidies. The practice that paragraph (i) of the List explicitly bans
is the following:
The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied
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the exported pasta which incorporates imported durum wheat, since
the E.E.C. remission is equal to or less than the import levy. 24 The
same might not be said for the exported pasta which incorporates
domestic durum wheat, although one observer has suggested an ar-
gument for treating domestically-produced tradeable inputs incor-
porated into exports as dutiable imports on which the duty is
refundable. This refund, or "substitution drawback," would be de-
termined by computing the difference between the domestic input
price and the equivalent c.i.f. import price.125
Paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List seemingly allows such sub-
stitution drawback in "particular cases" for domestic goods of quality
and characteristics comparable to imported goods. In addition, par-
agraph (i) establishes a double limit in that a firm must actually
import the equivalent goods and complete the corresponding export
operations within two years. 26 Not enough facts exist to determine
conclusively whether the substitution drawback on pasta could meet
these requirements. In any event, the reference to "particular cases"
and the provision for time limits would appear to indicate that
paragraph (i) permits substitution drawbacks only on a contingent
and irregular basis. Accordingly, if E.E.C. pasta producers commonly
used equivalent domestic goods regardless of particular circumstances
(such as transport difficulties or risk of not complying with delivery
obligations), paragraph (i) would not justify E.E.C. substitution draw-
backs.
A final possible argument in opposition to the Panel's conclusion
that the disputed E.E.C. refund is an export subsidy concerns par-
agraph (d) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. 2 7 Paragraph
on imported goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allow-
ance for waste) in the exported product; provided, however, that in particular
cases a firm may use a quantity of home market goods equal to, and having
the same quality and characteristics as, the imported goods as a substitute
for them in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the
corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable time period,
normally not to exceed two years.
Subsidies Code, supra note 2, article 19, Annex. The key language here is "in
excess," meaning that, a contrario, all remissions which are not in excess are not
true subsidies.
124 Cf. Low, supra note Ill, at 381.
125 Id. at 381 (defining "substitution drawback" as any measure taken "to reduce
the price of a domestically produced tradeable input into an exporting activity to
the duty-free price of an imported equivalent").
116 See supra note 123.
"I Paragraph (d) of the Illustrative List states that a subsidy is:
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(d) suggests that governments can deliver products used in the pro-
duction of goods for export to exporters at world market prices,
even if these prices are lower than those of like products used in
production for local consumption. It is unclear whether the term
"delivery" requires that governments be involved in producing or
supplying goods, or whether any input at world prices into an exported
product is allowed by means of governmental compensatory pay-
ments. '28 Under the latter construction, the contested refund on pasta
would be permissible because it would not qualify as an export
subsidy. The Panel, however, opted for the former, more literal,
interpretation of paragraph (d). 129 This interpretation seems to be
consistent with the customary meaning of the term "delivery," and
the restrictive purpose of the Illustrative List. As one author has
noted, however, paragraph (d) would probably not prohibit a scheme
in which Community agencies buy the wheat at a high domestic price
and deliver it at a lower world market price to pasta manufacturers
for export, if E.E.C. manufacturers had access to durum wheat on
the world market at the world market price. 30
4. Admissibility of the United States Claim
Although the Panel arguably reached the wrong decision in finding
that the subsidy was applied to pasta and not to durum wheat, a
strong argument can be made that the United States claim was
inadmissible under general international law. Once the Panel deter-
mined that the disputed subsidy applied to a non-primary product,
pasta, 3' it properly concluded that articles XVI:4 of GATT and 9
of the Code governed the dispute.'3 2 Article XVI:4, however, has
limited applicability; it binds only those GATT members which have
The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic
products or services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms
or conditions more favourable than for delivery of like or directly com-
petitive products or services for use in the production of goods for domestic
consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions are more
favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their
exporters.
Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 19, Annex.
28 See Low, supra note 11l, at 382.
,19 See Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.12, at 476 (stating that paragraph
(d) does not relate to governmental compensatory payments, but only to actual
delivery of inputs by governments).
130 E. McGOVERN, supra note I, § 11.322 (Supp. 1983).
,' See supra text and accompanying notes 101-105.
132 See Pasta Report, supra note 26.
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ratified an ad hoc multilateral agreement called "Declaration Giving
Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade."' 33 The United States ratified the Declaration,
subject to an "understanding" which appears to contemplate subsidy
practices analogous to the one in dispute in the pasta case:
[T]his Declaration shall not prevent the U.S., as part of its sub-
sidization of exports of a primary product, from making a payment
on an exported processed product (not itself a primary product),
which has been produced from such primary product, if such pay-
ment is essentially limited to the amount of the subsidy which would
have been payable on the quantity of such primary product, if
exported in primary form, consumed in the production of the proc-
essed product. 13
4
Despite its nomenclature, it appears clear that the United States
"understanding" is actually a reservation.'35 The difference is critical
because a reservation fundamentally modifies treaty rights and ob-
ligations between the reserving state and all non-objecting states,
while an understanding does not. 3 6
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation
as a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of
o133 445 U.N.T.S. 294 (1962); GATT, BISD 32 (9th Supp. 1971). This Declaration
was concluded on November 19, 1960 and entered into force on November 14, 1962.
For a list of those states bound by the Declaration, see GATT, Status of Legal
Instruments (GATT/LEG/I) 11 - 4.1 (1971). For a discussion of the special status
of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement and how it evolved, see J. JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 371-76.
'14 445 U.N.T.S. 294, 303 (1962); GATT, Status of Legal Instruments (GATT/
LEG/I) 11 - 4.2 (1971).
131 On the general subject of reservations international agreements, see Bowett,
Reservations, to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67
(1976-77); P.H. IMBERT, LES RESERVES AUX TRAITES MULTILATERAUX (1979); Ruda,
Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 95 (1975); Teboul, Remarques sur les reserves aux conventions de codi-
fication, 86 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 679 (1982): Coccia,
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1
(1985).
136 On the difference between a "reservation" and an "understanding" or "in-
terpretative declaration," see McRae, The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations,
49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 155 (1978); Bishop, Reservations to Treaties, 103 RECUEIL
DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 245, 303-22 (1961); 14 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1970).
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certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.' ' 37
Thus the substance of the governmental pronouncement, not its label,
determines its nature.
Admittedly, the Vienna Convention, which entered into force in
1980, applies to the United States Declaration of 1960 only as a
restatement of customary international law because the Convention
itself "applies only to treaties which are concluded by states after
the entry into force of the ... Convention with regard to such
states.' ' 3 Moreover, the United States is not a party to the Con-
vention. It is quite proper, however, to regard the Vienna Conven-
tion's provisions on reservations as a restatement or codification of
customary international law because they "generally reflect the dom-
inant modern view of the effect of reservations, as it has developed
in the practice of States and of the United Nations." 3 9 Furthermore,
the United States government has explicitly and implicitly acknowl-
edged the customary status of many provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention on many occasions, 14° including the Convention's rules on
reservations. 1 4'
The problem of discerning the actual intent of statements that
states issue upon ratification of or accession to a multilateral treaty
is resolved by applying ordinary rules of interpretation. International'
jurisprudence has developed two basic criteria to distinguish reser-
"I Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(d), May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added).
,31 Id. art. 4. This is the "non-retroactivity" provision of the Vienna Convention.
,19 Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIO NAL 25, 48 n.44 (1970). There have been some plain assertions by
international courts concerning the customary status of the Vienna Convention rules
on reservations. See Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration Case, (Gr. Br. v.
Fr.), 18 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 3, 32 (1977); Temeltasch Case, [1982] Y.B. EUR.
CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, reprinted in 5 EUR. HUMAN RIGHTS REP. 417, 431-32
(1983): see also Coccia, supra note 135, at 13-16.
- For example, in submitting the Convention for consideration by the Senate,
President Nixon declared that the Vienna Convention was "already generally rec-
organized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." S. EXEc.
Doc., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). The International Court of Justice has placed
high value on such unilateral declarations by a state's Chief Executive. See Nuclear
Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ Reports 253, 267-71. In daily diplomatic
correspondence, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is often referred to
by United States officials. See, e.g., 1973 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 360, 307; 1977
DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 107; 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 701, 767, 771, 775.
'See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 216; 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 263-
67. Since it is widely recognized that a large part of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties codifies general international law, further references to the Vienna
Convention are references to the related customary rules codified therein.
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vations from understandings. A statement has been found to qualify
as a reservation if: (a) it purports to exclude or modify the legal
effect of certain provisions, which is more than the mere exclusion
or modification of the actual terms of certain provisions, and (b) it
purports to expressly qualify the state's acceptance of the treaty.142
The United States "understanding" clearly seems to meet both of
these requirements. The Panel stated as much by observing that "the
U.S. understanding .. .had to be recognized as a reservation rather
than an interpretation."1
43
Since only one state formally objected to the United States reser-
vation,144 article XVI:4 of GATT as modified applies to govern the
relationships between the United States and all other parties to the
Declaration. 45 As a result, the E.E.C.'s subsidy on pasta is arguably
quite legal, at least vis-a-vis the United States, because the United
States reservation allows the E.E.C. to engage in practices covered
by the reservation itself. 46 The United States did not, however, rei-
terate this reservation with respect to article 9 of the Subsidies Code,
and the Panel concluded that "the U.S. was not estopped from
14 See Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration Case supra note 139, at 38-
40; Temeltasch Case, supra note 139, at 431-34. See generally Coccia, supra note
135, at 9-11; Imbert, La question des reserves dans la Decision A rbitrale du 30 juin
1977 relative a la delimitation due plateau continental entre la Republique Francaise
et le Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, 1978 ANNUAIRE
FRANCAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 29; Imbert, Reservations to the European
Convention on Human Rights Before the Strasbourg Commission - The Temeltasch
Case, 33 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 558 (1984); Bowett, supra note 135, at 90-92; McRae,
supra note 136, at 162; Boyle, The Law of Treaties and the Anglo-French Continental
Shelf Arbitration, 29 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 498 (1980).
,43 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.6, at 475.
- Southern Rhodesia; GATT, Status of Legal Instruments (GATT/LEG/I) 11-
4.2 (1971).
,,1 See articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 137.
'46 The E.E.C. as such did not sign the Declaration, although all of its member
states did sign individually. Formalistically, this might appear to be a difficult legal
problem, but the E.E.C.'s participation in GATT must be viewed from a broader
perspective. In accordance with article 113 of the E.E.C. treaty, which establishes
a common commercial policy, the Community has taken over the powers of its
member states in this area, effectively substituting for them. Once this substitution
has been accepted by the other contracting parties in reference to the General
Agreement, it must also be accepted as applying to the related side agreements such
as the Declaration at issue. This has been acknowledged by regular GATT practice,
as well as several decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
See, e.g., International Fruit Cases, 20-24/72, 18 RECUEIL 1219 (1972), COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) J 8194.
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challenging the E.E.C. practice in question."'' 47 The Panel also con-
cluded that "the United States had recognized in its submission to
the Panel that the United States gave up the legal right to engage
in this practice."'' 4 The determination that the United States Gov-
ernment waived its reservation by arguing its case should have no
bearing on this dispute, however, because of its obvious ex post facto
nature.
Moreover, another argument contradicts the Panel's finding that
the United States did not intend to assert the same reservation with
respect to the Subsidies Code. When confronting incompatible pro-
visions of international agreements on the same subject matter, it is
well-established that the latter in time prevails. 49 Are article XVI:4
of GATT, as modified with respect to the United States by its
reservation, and article 9 of the Code incompatible? It does not seem
so for several reasons. First, the Code contains no express language
concerning the subject matter of the United States reservation. As
one Panel member noted in his dissenting opinion, "Article 9 ...
did not address the issue of the incorporation of subsidized primary
products components, and could thus not be used as a decisive
guidance for the conclusion to be drawn on the present case. ' ' 0
In addition, as the Panel acknowledged, "there was no record of
any discussion or understanding as to the interpretation of Article
9" during the Tokyo Round negotiations.' 5 ' In the absence of travaux
preparatoires'5 2 on this issue, and considering that as many as fifteen
states which adopted the Code were simultaneously bound by the
reservation vis-a-vis the United States, the Panel should not have
presumed that the parties intended to alter the current system of
rights and obligations under article XVI:4, without explicit evidence
,41 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 4.7, at 475.
,41 Id. (emphasis added).
4 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 137, art. 30.
,5 Pasta Report, supra note 26, para. 5.2, at 476.
Id. para. 4.5, at 475.
,52 The background and events, such as records of conference proceedings, treaty
drafts and the like, leading up to stipulation of a treaty are traditionally called
travaux preparatoires, or preparatory works. "The importance of travaux prepar-
atoires [as a means of treaty interpretation] is not to be underestimated and their
relevance is difficult to deny, since the question whether a text can be said to be
clear is in some degree subjective." De Arechaga, International Law in the
Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEn. DES COURS DE L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-




of this in the text of the Code. The more sensible presumption would
be that the parties would have articulated a desire to alter a twenty-
year-old legal practice.
Finally, the Code is not an independent international agreement,
but an "Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles
VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."' 53
This fact makes it difficult to contend that article 9 of the Code can
be applied without considering article XVI:4 of the GATT. In sum,
the legal system of rights and obligations established by article XVI:4
of the GATT, as interpreted and applied by article 9 of the Subsidies
Code, seemingly prohibits the United States from challenging the
subsidies at issue, since they fall within the boundaries of the United
States own reservation.
In conclusion, although the Panel report on the pasta case may
be subject to criticism for its treatment of some of the legal issues
involved, the Panel deserves credit for taking several clear positions,
unlike its counterpart in the wheat flour case. Another positive aspect
of this report is the presence of a dissenting opinion by one member
of the Panel, a rarity in previous GATT cases. The use of dissenting
opinions is an invaluable feature of the common law tradition, and
has been adopted by major international law tribunals such as the
International Court of Justice. The Panel's adoption of this practice
perhaps constitutes a small step toward a more "juridical" model of
dispute settlement. 5 4
IV. SOME REMARKS ON GATT DISPUTES SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
The Panel reports on the wheat flour and pasta cases became public
in March and May of 1983, respectively. To date, neither the Subsidies
Code Committee, which received the reports in accordance with article
18:8 of the Code, nor any other GATT body has formally responded
to them. Article 18:9 of the Code provides that:
The Committee shall consider the panel report as soon as possible
and, taking into account the findings contained therein, may make
recommendations to the parties with a view to resolving the dispute.
" The function that the Subsidies Code is intended to serve in the GATT system
is evident in the Code's Preamble: "Desiring to apply fully and to interpret the
provisions of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade . . . ." Subsidies Code, supra note 2, preamble.
,14 See R. HUDEC, supra note 11, at 52.
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If the Committee's recommendations are not followed within a
reasonable period, the Committee may authorize appropriate coun-
termeasures (including withdrawal of GATT concessions or obli-
gations) taking into account the nature and degree of the adverse
effect found to exist. Committee recommendations should be pre-
sented to the parties within thirty days of the receipt of the panel
report. 
5 5
Obviously, the Committee has completely disregarded its obligation
to present recommendations to the parties within thirty days of the
receipt of the Panel report. Neither the United States, nor the E.E.C.,
have received any recommendation from the Subsidies Committee or
any other appropriate GATT body with regard to the Panel reports
on wheat flour and pasta.
Curiously, the Subsidies Code does not provide for any voting
procedure, 5 6 but the Code Committee's practice has adopted the
traditional GATT practice of making decisions by consensus,' a
methodology followed by nearly every international institution. 5 8 At
the thirty-eighth Session of GATT, the Contracting Parties reaffirmed
the use of consensus for the settlement of GATT disputes, and "agreed
that obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be
avoided." 5 9 In light of the formal expression of the contracting parties
on this question, one can hardly justify the resistance of the E.E.C.
and, to even a lesser extent, that of the United States in adopting
and implementing the two Panel reports.' 60
"I Subsidies Code, supra note 2, article 18:9.
156 The lack of a voting procedure, as one author has remarked, is "a striking
omission." Jackson, The Birth of the GA 7T-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal,
supra note 11, at 50; see also Jackson, GA TT Machinery and the Tokyo Round
Agreements, supra note 19, at 177.
-7 Cf. R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 261-62.
"8 Consensus is usually defined as the lack of any formal objection or opposition.
This concept has been officially codified in article 161(8)(e) of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature in Montego Bay, Jamaica on December
10, 1982. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in United Nations, The
Law of the Sea, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983). See generally Cassese, Consensus
and Some of Its Pitfalls, 58 RivISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 754 (1975); Sperduti,
Consensus in International Law, 2 ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 33 (1976); Treves, Devices
to Facilitate Consensus: The Experience of the Law of the Sea Conference, 2 ITAL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1976).
119 See supra note 44, at 16.
- One should not automatically assume that things would have been smoother
if a majority-vote procedure had been adopted. In fact, other member states of the
Subsidies Committee have sided either with the E.E.C. (e.g., Switzerland, Sweden,
and Norway) or with the United States (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and
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While the wheat flour and pasta cases were deadlocked, another
agricultural dispute arose between the United States and the E.E.C.
in which the United States accused the E.E.C. of discriminating
against its citrus exports. A Panel concluded in late 1984 that the
E.E.C. practice had adversely affected United States citrus producers,
and recommended that the E.E.C. reduce the most-favored-nation
rate of duty on citrus. 16' Once again, the E.E.C. resisted adoption
of the Panel report, and the United States and the E.E.C. were unable
to reach a negotiated solution. Consequently, President Reagan, re-
lying upon his authority under Section 301, announced on June 20,
1985 that the United States would increase duties on pasta imported
from the E.E.C. in retaliation for the E.E.C.'s discriminatory prac-
tices against United States citrus exports.' 62 Specifically, the Admin-
istration resolved to raise import duties from 0.25% to 2507o on pasta
products containing egg and from 0.5% to 40% on pasta products
without egg. 163 In response, the E.E.C. announced on June 27 that
it would retaliate upon United States imports of lemons and walnuts
by raising duties from 8% to 20076 and from 8076 to 30%, respec-
tively. 16
After several days of negotiations between United States and E.E.C.
trade representatives, the two sides announced a compromise on July
19.165 Under this agreement, the United States pledged to suspend
the established duty increase on pasta until October 31, 1985.166 In
Canada) over these disputes, thus making the achievement of any type of decision
politically very difficult, regardless of whatever voting system might be adopted. See
U.S. - E.C. Wrangling over Pasta: Wheat Subsidies Reports Continue at GATT, 8
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 11, at 412-13 (Jn. 15, 1983).
6 See GATT, GATT Activities 36-38 (1984); United States Information Agency,
Wireless File, Europe File no. 404, June 26, 1985.
162 See generally supra note 15.
163 Presidential Proclamation No. 5354 of June 21, 1985, Increase in the Rates of
Duty for Certain Pasta Articles From the European Economic Community, 50 Fed.
Reg. 26,143 (1985). See generally N.Y. Times, June 21, 1985, at DI, col. 3; la
Repubblica, June 22, 1985, at 37, col. 1.
I" N.Y. Times, June 28, 1985, at D2, col. 4; la Repubblica, June 28, 1985, at
39, col. 1. On July 11, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by a large
majority on E.E.C. - U.S. agriculture trade, condemning United States unilateral
measures and calling for further bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the
context of GATT. 1985-86 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 23) 6 (July 11, 1985); 1985-86
EUR. PARL. Doc. Nos. B2-670, 674, 694, 702, and 704 (1985).
6 See N.Y. Times, July 20, 1985, at 33, col. 1; United States Information Agency,
Wireless File, Europe File No. 504, July 19, 1985; la Repubblica, July 21, 1985, at
37, col. 5.
,1 Presidential Proclamation No. 5363 of August 15, 1985, Modification of the
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return, the E.E.C. refrained from increasing duties on lemons and
walnuts, pledged to make its market more accessible for United States
citrus exports by October 31, and reduced the refunds on durum
wheat used in pasta exported to the United States by 46° o.167 Since
the E.E.C. failed on its pledge to improve accessibility for United
States citrus exports by October 31, the United States has not delayed
implementation of its cited tariff increase on E.E.C. pasta imports.
Consequently, the E.E.C. has raised duties on United States lemons
and walnuts, and has cancelled the cited reduction of export refunds
on durum wheat.' 68
The use of Section 301 presidential authority to effect unilateral
action outside of the GATT framework has led to a bitter state in
the long-standing dispute over pasta. Although both parties' unilateral
actions are probably inconsistent with the Subsidies Code, 169 the
parties have opted for the tempting short-run gains of protectionism
instead of the long-run economic benefits which result from coop-
Effective Date for Increased Rates of Duty for Certain Pasta Articles From the
European Economic Community, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1985).
161 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2010085 of 19 July 1985, Annex, 28 0. J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 188) 30 (1985). This Regulation was based on, and authorized
by, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1982/85 of 16 July 1985, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 186) 8 (1985). The Italian Government, supported by the French Government,
has strongly disapproved of the agreement reached by E.E.C. Commissioner de
Clercq, and voted against its adoption (without, however, resorting to the veto
power). The Italian Government has criticized the terms of the settlement for yielding
too much to the United States at the expense of a single member state. Italy asserts
that it is harmed twice by the agreement because it is both the E.E.C.'s largest
citrus producer and pasta exporter. La Repubblica, July 17, 1985, at 42, col. 5; I1
Messaggero, July 27, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
16 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3068/85 of 27 June 1985, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 292) 1 (1985); Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3114/85 of 7 November
1985, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 296) 38 (1985).
69 Article 19 of the Subsidies Code provides that "[nJo specific action against a
subsidy of another signatory can be taken except in accordance with the provisions
of the General Agreement, as intepreted by this Agreement." Subsidies Code, supra
note 2, art. 19. The United States President has historically been reluctant to use
§ 301 authority to act unilaterally in response to foreign trade practices because of
the questionable legality of unilateral retaliation and other reasons. Former United
States Trade Representative William Brock publicly declared that "retaliation is not
a preferred result in any 301 case. Rather, our goal is to eliminate or modify a
foreign practice which is adversely affecting U.S. interests. The authority to retalitate
conferred by Section 301 is intended to provide the necessary leverage to obtain this
result." European Communities' Common Agricultural Policy, the Subsidies Code,
and Enforcement of U.S. Rights under Trade Agreements: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982).
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eration.'7 0 Although future negotiations may produce solutions more
consistent with free trade principles, the failure of the GATT frame-
work to implement effectively the recommendations of the Panel
report on pasta and the subsequent increase in tensions between the
United States and the E.E.C. raise serious questions about the future
of GATT's dispute settlement system. After the Tokyo Round, there
was widespread hope that the dispute settlement procedures of the
new codes would be effective.171 The Subsidies Code procedure, al-
though only a slight variation of established GATT procedures for
dispute settlement, was regarded by many as the most potentially
effective code procedure. 72 The first two disputes litigated under the
Subsidies Code have fallen far short of expectations in this regard.
The failure to fashion more effective GATT dispute settlement
procedures, both during and after the Tokyo Round, is largely at-
tributable to the EE.C.'s firm opposition to such reform. 73 Whether
the E.E.C. will now change its attitude is difficult to predict. For
the moment, the E.E.C.'s actions have undoubtedly contributed to
a considerable loss of credibility for the GATT system of dispute
settlement. 174
One way to strengthen the Subsidies Code's dispute resolution
system would be to make Panel reports legally binding upon disputing
parties, instead of requiring, as is now the case, that the Subsidies
170 For discussion of the dilemma governments face in deciding whether to opt
for protectionism or free trade, see Abbott, the Trading Nation's Dilemma: The
Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 501 (1985)
(author uses a game theory framework to organize analysis of the functions of
international trade law, and shows long-run costs of protectionism and retaliatory
measures).
"I Cf. Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, supra note 11; DeKieffer, supra note 11; Herzstein, The Role of Law and
Lawyers under the New Multilateral Trade Agreements, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
177 (1979).
72 For a detailed comparison between dispute settlement provisions of the Tokyo
Round codes and the procedures developed under article XXIII of the General
Agreement, see Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An
Unfinished Business, supra note 11, at 174-77.
,7" This E.E.C. attitude has drawn some criticism. See Patterson, The European
Community as a Threat to the System, in TRADE POLICY OF THE 1980's 223, 237-
41 (W.R. Cline ed. 1983).
'14 It does not seem that the E.E.C. is going to change its attitude on the dispute
settlement issue. The E.E.C. Council, in a declaration issued on March 19, 1985 in
support of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, did not mention dispute
settlement as a topic for possible negotiation. See EC: Support for New GA TT
Round, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 305 (1985).
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Committee adopt the reports. Parties would probably only agree to
this reform, however, on the condition that the automatic right to
the establishment of a Panel currently provided for by article 18:1
of the Code be abolished. 7 ' Panels would thus be created in ac-
cordance with the previous agreement of the concerned parties, as is
the usual practice in international arbitration proceedings. 76 This
system would perhaps reduce the number of disputes resolved by
Panels, and would probably discourage litigation of the most con-
troversial issues. Such a system would nonetheless be more effective
in implementing the decisions made, and precedents on the interpre-
tation of the Subsidies Code, or of any other GATT rule, could
gradually be established.
Another alternative could be to encourage states to recognize as
compulsory the jurisdiction of Panels through previous unilateral
declarations, but allowing them, however, to make reservations to
exclude certain categories of disputes. 7 7 The obvious model for this
scheme would be that found in article 36(2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.1 78 Since the number of states that are
parties to the Subsidies Code is relatively restricted, such a system
might be more effective for GATT than it has been for the I.C.J.
There are other interesting possibilities,' 7 9 but the paramount goal
of any reform ought to be to make Panel decisions binding on
disputing parties. Perhaps a simple amendment to article 18:9 of the
Subsidies Code, requiring the Committee to adopt automatically the
Panel report it receives unless it makes recommendations by a given
deadline, would suffice. Obviously, if the Subsidies Code was amended
in this way, Panel reports would have to provide concrete recom-
" "The Committee shall establish a panel upon request.... ".Subsidies Code,
supra note 2, article 18:1 (emphasis added).
176 See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 706 (3d
ed. 1979).
1" For example, the E.E.C. could accept jurisdiction in such a manner and exclude
any dispute related to the "variable levy," for which an express acceptance would
be necessary.
"I June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
,79 Consider, for example, the interesting proposal to establish a system of direct
access by private interests or firms to international litigation, using the European
Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes as models. Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing the
Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MIcH.
L. REV. 267, 394-96 (1982).
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mendations to the parties so as not to require any further action by
another GATT body.
The Panel structure itself could be improved by requiring that
Panels be composed exclusively of independent trade experts instead
of governmental representatives to GATT, as is the case today. 8 0
One possible shortcoming of this reform, however, would lie in the
difficulty of securing truly independent experts who are both familiar
with the intricacies of GATT and willing to judge controversial trade
cases.' 8'
Perhaps a system could be created analogous to that of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration. 8 2 Under such a scheme the Contracting
Parties would maintain a permanent list of independent arbitrators.
When a dispute arises, each party would appoint two arbitrators from
the list, and the four arbitrators would together select an umpire.
Therefore, a "tribunal" would arise only to hear a particular case,
although the judicial body itself would be a permanent institution.
The growing prestige of such an institution could attract eminent
lawyers and experts who would lend authority to the rulings given.8 3
In any event, the GATT dispute settlement procedures clearly need
to be strengthened in light of the lengthy deadlock resulting from
the first two cases litigated under the Subsidies Code.'84 Perhaps a
reformation of the Subsidies Code dispute settlement mechanism
would ultimately improve the general GATT procedures of article
XXIII. It is unrealistic to anticipate significant reforms in the short
term, but even minor reforms will be a welcome first step. The major
11o See Jackson, supra note 21.
"' Past experiences with outside experts have arguably been less than satisfactory.
Cf. GATT, BISD 98, 114, 127 (23d Supp. 1977) (the "DISC" case and related
countercomplaints). See generally Jackson, supra note 21.
"2 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 176, at 707-08.
,81 Cf. the 12th recommendation of the Leutwiler Report: "In support of improved
and strengthened rules, GATT's dispute settlement procedures should be reinforced
by building up a permanent roster of non-governmental experts to examine disputes,
and by improving the implementation of panel recommendations. Third parties should
use their rights to complain when bilateral agreements break the rules." GATT,
supra note 99, at 46. For a general explanation of the Leutwiler Report, see supra
note 99.
184 As a point of interest, the United States International Trade Commission
(I.T.C.) has recently instituted an investigation under § 332(b) of the Tariff Act of
1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1332(b)), concerning the effectiveness of dispute settlement pro-
cedures under the General Agreement and the Tokyo Round codes. The I.T.C. final
report was expected to be released by December 31, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,716
(1985).
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trade powers, especially the United States and the E.E.C., should
negotiate in good faith to reach a specific agreement on the basic
procedural issues.'85 Otherwise, any improvement realized on sub-
stantive law issues is bound to have little practical meaning.
"I The dispute settlement issue will probably be a major topic at the next round
of multilateral trade negotiations. In his nomination hearing before the Senate Finance
Committee on June 25, 1985, United States Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter
included dispute settlement among the main issues which needed to be addressed in
a new round of trade negotiations. He particularly emphasized the importance of
improving timeliness and decisiveness in the dispute settlement process. United States
Information Agency, Wireless File, Europe File no. 207, June 26, 1985; E.E.C.
views, however, seem to differ. See supra note 174.
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